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REFLECTIONS ON EXECUTIVE
COMPENSATION AND A MODEST
PROPOSAL FOR (FURTHER) REFORM
Mark J. Loewenstein*
I. INTRODUCTION
xecutive compensation in publicly-held corporations, particularly
the compensation of the chief executive officer ("CEO"), is of
perennial interest. Like movie stars and sports figures, highly-
paid CEOs attract media attention. Each spring, when publicly-held cor-
porations report on executive pay, stories about executive compensation
are as predictable as stories about spring flooding. The only question, in
each instance, is the extent of the damage.
But the public outcry that accompanies stories on CEO pay has no
parallel in sports or cinema, where lavish compensation is hardly un-
known. Little controversy follows a disclosure that a movie star will re-
ceive $10 million for his or her next motion picture, but criticism abounds
when the media reports that the average compensation for the country's
highest paid CEOs exceeds $2 million. People feel, instinctively, that if a
movie studio pays a star $10 million for a single motion picture, the star
must be worth that much, but the public is skeptical that the studio's
CEO is worth $10 million for serving in that capacity for the year. And,
there is some basis for the public's cynicism, as representatives of the
studio and the star seem to deal at arm's length when the star's compen-
sation is fixed, but the CEO and the board at least seem to sit on the
same side of the table when the CEO's compensation is determined.
The current debate over executive compensation revolves around sev-
eral different questions, not always separately identified: first, are U.S.
CEOs overcompensated; second, if CEOs are overcompensated, why is
that the case; and third, again assuming that overcompensation is proven,
how can the situation best be rectified. Lurking behind the third question
are further questions as to whether governmental intervention is either
appropriate or likely to be effective in reducing compensation levels, or
whether intervention would have the unintended consequence of harm-
ing corporate performance. Finally, assuming overcompensation is not
proven, we might ask whether the public perception of overcompensation
is worth addressing and, if so, how.
* Professor, University of Colorado at Boulder School of Law. J.D., 1974, and B.A.,
1969, University of Illinois.
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The first two questions are dealt with in the next section, where I sug-
gest that no clear answer emerges from the empirical work as to whether
CEOs are overcompensated, but that apparent deficiencies in corporate
governance support the popular perception that they are.' In reaction to
the popular perception, the federal government has seen fit to seek to
"correct" this problem. This intervention, together with the judiciary's
approach to the problem, should be considered in light of the uncertainty
that a problem exists. While one might argue that no governmental inter-
vention is appropriate, the persistent public perception that a problem
exists, coupled with the strong possibility that this perception is accurate,
justifies an intervention designed to strengthen corporate governance
without adversely affecting corporate performance. This Article consid-
ers the role of the judiciary, the interventions recently put in place, and
other proposed interventions. The Article concludes with a modest pro-
posal designed to provide some assurance that CEO pay is within reason-
able limits.
II. A VIEW OF OVERCOMPENSATION AND THE
QUICK FIXES
The standard analysis of CEO compensation begins with a recitation of
eye-catching statistics. For instance, in the most recent Wall Street Jour-
nal annual report on executive pay, the median combined salary and bo-
nus for CEOs in 350 of the largest U.S. companies was $1,432,000 in 1995,
an increase of 10.4% from 1994 levels.2 Another recent study, which ex-
amined CEO pay over the period 1992-1994, used as a sample CEOs who
had served for at least three years in one of the 424 largest U.S. publicly-
held corporations. 3 Due to turnover in the corporations that were in-
cluded in the sample, there were only 292 CEOs who had served for at
least three years.4 These individuals earned an average of $2.7 million
(including base salary, performance bonus, and long-term incentives) in
1992. 5 This average (among the same individuals) increased to $3.3 mil-
lion in 1993, and $3.7 million in 1994, amounting to increases of 20.6%
and 12.8%, respectively. 6 By contrast, the average American worker
earned $18,900 in 1992, $19,390 in 1993, and $20,000 in 1994, thus realiz-
ing gains of only 2.6% in 1993 and 3% in 1994.7 As a result, the pay of
CEOs in this sample, as a multiple of the pay of the average American
worker, went from 145 times in 1992, to 170 times in 1993, to 187 times in
1. A 1990 Gallup Poll estimated that more than 70% of the American public thinks
that corporate executives are paid "too much." Jay Schmiedeskamp, Majority of Ameri-
cans Think That Top Officials Are Overpaid, GALLUP POLL MONTHLY, Dec. 1990, at 21-22.
2. Joann S. Lublin, The Great Divide, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R1 [hereinafter
Great Divide].
3. Graef Crystal, In Game of 'I Win, You Lose,' CEOs are Getting Richer Faster Than








Another favorite yardstick is a comparison of the compensation of U.S.
CEOs to the compensation of their European counterparts. On this ba-
sis, too, the compensation of U.S. CEOs is impressive, if not excessive.
For instance, a recent study conducted by Hewitt Associates, a manage-
ment consulting firm, compared the average compensation of U.S. and
European CEOs at companies with median annual revenues of $500 mil-
lion. 9 Compensation, for these purposes, included base salary, annual bo-
nus, employee benefits, long-term incentives, and perquisites (the one
category where European CEOs outpace their American counterparts). 1
The survey showed that CEOs in the U.S. earned, on average, $1,085,000,
compared to $551,600 for CEOs in Great Britain, $537,000 for CEOs in
Germany, $485,004 for CEOs in France, and $318,000 for CEOs in Italy."
The public perception of overcompensation, which is suggested by such
figures, is confirmed, and in part shaped, by critics such as Graef Crystal,
who has written extensively on executive compensation. 12 A recent sur-
vey conducted by Mr. Crystal, analyzing 1994 pay, suggests, as past stud-
ies have, that the link between CEO pay and company performance is
slight, at best, and among smaller publicly-held corporations, it is nonex-
istent.13 Crystal and others argue, based largely on statistical compari-
sons, that U.S. CEOs are overcompensated; they also seek to explain
why. 1
4
In this view, the CEO is an informed seller of his services, but the
board is not an informed buyer. Additionally, the negotiations fixing
compensation are not at arm's length. The board relies on its compensa-
tion committee, which consists of highly paid chief executives from other
companies. For this and other reasons, the board is insufficiently moti-
vated to engage in hard bargaining. Moreover, the compensation com-
mittee depends on outside consultants who are not wholly objective in
their recommendations. These outside consultants are beholden to the
CEO for their initial appointment and are anxious to obtain other con-
sulting business from the company, such as consulting on employee bene-
fit plans.
Critics also cite the effect of compensation surveys as an explanation
for excessive compensation. When a typical board or compensation com-
8. Id.
9. Tara Parker-Pope, So Far Away, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R12.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Mr. Crystal writes regularly on executive compensation for the Los Angeles Times,
Fortune, and other publications. Indeed, Mr. Crystal seems to have made a career of ana-
lyzing, reporting, and critiquing executive compensation.
13. Graef Crystal, CEOs and Incentives: The Myth of 'Pay-For-Performance,' L.A.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at D1; see also Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, CEO Incen-
tives-It Is Not How Much You Pay Them, But How, HARv. Bus. REV., May-June 1990, at
138 [hereinafter Jensen & Murphy]. But the work of some economists suggests otherwise.
See infra note 23.
14. See, e.g., DEREK BOK, THE COST OF TALENT 95-118 (1993); GRAEF CRYSTAL, IN
SEARCH OF EXCESS: THE OVERCOMPENSATION OF AMERICAN EXECUTIVES 42-50 (1991).
1996]
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mittee reviews surveys conducted by the compensation consultant, it will
seek to pay its CEO the average or higher. Obviously, if enough compa-
nies adopt this attitude, CEO pay will rise for that reason alone. 15
Another frequently cited reason for the board's poor bargaining is the
interdependent relationship between the board's outside directors and
the CEO. These directors, who bear the responsibility of approving com-
pensation plans, are dependent on the CEO for their compensation as
board members, compensation which has also risen dramatically in recent
years.
I 'These observations and conclusions are not, of course, unchallenged,
but scholarly work disputing the proposition that U.S. CEOs are
overcompensated is thin. For instance, in 1992, the Harvard Business Re-
view ("Review") published an article by two Wall Street lawyers that, in
effect, disputed the proposition that CEOs are overpaid. 16 Instead, the
authors argued, the debate over CEO pay has been fueled by "political
correctness," and, in fact, CEOs are fairly compensated in relation to
their performance. 17 To support this latter conclusion, the authors relied
primarily on a then unpublished study by a compensation expert with a
national accounting firm. 18 That expert concluded that the pay of CEOs
matches performance in 80% of the cases. 19 According to the authors,
the superior methodology of this study, which accounts for industry com-
plexity, management initiatives, and risk in a way that other studies do
not, justifies reliance on its conclusions.20 This study was immediately
attacked, in a subsequent issue of the Review, by Crystal and others.21
15. A survey of 100 companies conducted by Crystal indicated that 35 companies aim
at the top quarter of the distribution, 65 aim for the middle, and none aim to fix compensa-
tion below average. Graef Crystal, Why CEO Compensation Is So High, CAL. MGMT.
REV., Fall 1991, at 20. See also Great Divide, supra note 2, at R4 ("The success of CEO
celebrity heroes triggered a wave of financial leapfrogging by other chiefs who didn't nec-
essarily deserve gold-plated pay. Boards contributed to this ratcheting effect by increas-
ingly pegging a leader's compensation at the highest quartile of a survey group, rather than
the median.").
16. Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press?
Congress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28.
17. Id. at 29.
18. Id. at 30.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. In the succeeding issue of the Review, Crystal and other critics of executive com-
pensation took issue with the cited study, which was done by Michael Kesner of Arthur
Andersen & Company. CEO Pay: How Much is Enough?, HARV. Bus. REV., July-Aug.
1992, at 130.
Crystal's criticism of Kesner focused on these and other factors:
1. Kesner's work was unpublished and thus unavailable for scholarly critique.
2. Kesner defined performance as one-year growth in sales and one-year return on eq-
uity, eschewing the more traditional measure of total shareholder return.
3. In Crystal's view, Kesner's data does not support the conclusion that CEO pay
matches performance. Id.
Crystal is similarly critical of Jensen and Murphy's oft-cited article, see Jensen & Mur-
phy, supra note 13, at 183, which recommends that CEO pay be linked to performance. Id.
at 130-31. Jensen and Murphy had concluded, based on a study of 430 publicly-held corpo-
rations, that pay was not adequately linked to performance, but that CEOs would perform
more effectively if that were the case. Id. at 131. In response, Crystal writes, "[ulsing their
[Vol. 50
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Criticisms aside, it is noteworthy that these defenders of CEO pay re-
lied on a single, unpublished study as their principle authority for the
proposition that CEO pay is commensurate with performance. 22 This is
not a reflection of poor research by the authors, but rather a reflection of
the paucity of literature defending CEO pay.23 Furthermore, the litera-
ture that does exist tends to be in professional journals and tends to focus
on the presence or absence of a statistical relationship between executive
compensation and corporate performance.
24
The work of those who criticize CEO pay, although appealing, simply
does not "prove" that any particular CEO is overpaid, much less that an
entire class of CEOs is overpaid. What is lacking in such work is some
indication of what the CEOs would earn if the market for their services
were more efficient. In the absence of evidence that the "overpaid" indi-
viduals would have been willing to accept less for their services, or that
CEOs occupy some sort of monopoly position regarding executive serv-
ices, it is difficult to accept the proposition as proven. On the other hand,
the "opposing" studies tend to conclude, at best, that executive pay does
bear a statistical relationship to corporate performance. 25 Such studies
do not prove that CEOs are not being overpaid, at least in the sense of
proving that the market for CEOs is working efficiently.
Nevertheless, the systemic shortcomings in the operation of the typical
corporate board noted above combined with the staggering pay levels
certainly give rise to a strong inference that overcompensation is present.
This inference, in turn, has been the justification for governmental inter-
ference, through judicial activism and administrative and congressional
action. Rather than seeking to rebut this inference, writers who have re-
sisted governmental interference have tended to focus on the importance
430 companies and their sensitivity numbers, I discovered that there is no significant rela-
tionship between pay-package sensitivity and total shareholder return, whether the time
window is one year, ten years, or any intervening period." Id.
Interestingly, Kesner also wrote in the same issue, but did not defend his analysis. Id. at
133.
22. Kesner subsequently published an article on the subject. See Michael Kesner, Are
U.S. Executives Paid Too Much?, CORPORATION, Feb. 1, 1993, at 1.
23. There are, of course, other defenders. See, e.g., Kevin J. Murphy, Top Executives
Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, HARV. Bus. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1986, at 125. In addition,
some studies in academic journals also support the proposition that there is a statistical
correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance. See, e.g.,
Michael C. Jensen & Jerold L. Zimmerman, Managerial Compensation and the Managerial
Labor Market, 7 J. Accr. & ECON. 3 (1985); Wilbur Lewellen et al., Executive Compensa-
tion and the Performance of the Firm, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 65 (1992); Ke-
vin J. Murphy, Corporate Performance and Managerial Remuneration: An Empirical
Analysis, 7 J. Accr. & ECON. 11 (1985); Ahmed Riahi-Belkaoui, Executive Compensation,
Organizational Effectiveness, Social Performance and Firm Performance: An Empirical In-
vestigation, 19 J. Bus. FIN. & Accr. 125 (1992). While such studies tend to prove a positive
correlation between executive compensation and corporate performance, they have noth-
ing to say about the level of compensation. Moreover, economists are hardly in agreement
that pay reflects corporate performance. See, e.g., ROBERT C. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW
193 n.6 (1985); John E. Garen, Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory, 102 J.
POL. ECON. 1175 (1994).




of pay plans that better "align" the CEO's incentives with shareholder
interests, arguing that if shareholders benefit, the problem of overcom-
pensation-and the necessity of governmental interference-becomes
moot. Indeed, the literature is full of writings extolling the virtues of such
plans, proposing either that CEO pay be heavily dependent on meeting
certain performance goals (for example, earnings per share, return on in-
vestment, or increases in stock price and dividends) or that compensation
be heavily weighted toward stock options or restricted stock.26 Another
frequently proposed remedy, which often accompanies the suggestion
that pay be linked to performance, is to increase the representation of
independent directors on the board, on the theory that directors in-
dependent of management will bargain harder (with management) and
direct more effectively. None of these solutions is without significant
problems.
The pay-for-performance idea is often expressed in these terms: The
amount of compensation is not important; rather, what is important is the
method by which compensation is determined. Proponents of this view
argue that CEO pay should be tied to increases in shareholder wealth,
that if the CEO's efforts make the shareholders better off, the sharehold-
ers should have no complaints. But such arguments beg the question.
Even assuming that the CEO should share in the wealth he has helped to
create, the question is still open as to what portion of that additional
wealth should be paid to the CEO. Intuitively, it seems that the CEO
ought not to receive half of the gain, particularly if the gain in share-
holder wealth is in the tens of million of dollars. But why not, under this
reasoning? The intuition is based on the notion that in most, if not all,
cases, the CEO cannot take sole credit for the gain, and ought not to
receive the lion's share of it. The intuition is also based on notions of
fairness and equity, notions that underlay the entire debate on executive
compensation. It is no answer to dismiss such notions as romantic and
irrelevant. The notions are relevant and result in real consequences, such
as the administrative and legislative responses discussed below.27
There is little debate over the proposition that executive compensation
should, at least in part, be tied to performance, or put differently, that the
executive's incentives and shareholder interests should converge. 28 But
26. See, e.g., Jensen & Murphy, supra note 13, at 138; Kevin J. Murphy, Politics, Eco-
nomics, and Executive Compensation, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 713 (1995).
27. There is some basis for believing that seemingly excessive CEO pay has a deleteri-
ous affect on employee morale. See ROBERT A.G. MONKS & NELL MINOW, POWER AND
ACCOUNTABILITY 170 (1991). See also Great Divide, supra note 2, at R4 (discussing the
effect of high CEO pay on employee morale); BOK, supra note 14, at 104:
The entire country has an interest in whether earnings are above what is
needed to attract and motivate corporate leaders. After all, the distribution
of income affects the degree of justice in the society, the public's confidence
in the economic system, even the balance of political power and influence in
the nation.
28. But see BOK, supra note 14, at 108-14 (questioning the wisdom of pay-for-perform-
ance plans). Consider, as well, the discontinuity between close corporation tax cases and
the controversy surrounding the publicly-held companies. The Service will scrutinize com-
[Vol. 50
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in serious consideration about executive compensation those propositions
are only the beginning of the inquiry, not the end.29 As noted above, the
absolute amount of compensation, regardless of formula, is still
important.
Of equal importance is the design of the plan itself. For instance, the
popular idea, that executive compensation should be tied to increases in
shareholder wealth, that is, increases in stock price and dividends, may
not necessarily redound to the long-term interests of shareholders. In-
creases in shareholder wealth are a function not only of managerial com-
petence and effort, but also of factors beyond the executives' influence,
such as general economic conditions, the strategies and operations of
competitors, and political events. To the extent that corporate manage-
ment bears the risk of the occurrence (or nonoccurrence) of these and
other such variables over which they have no control, management may
have an incentive to pursue strategies such as diversification that will re-
duce these risks. But shareholders, through the diversification of their
portfolios, have already reduced these risks to the extent they deem ap-
propriate. Thus, further risk reduction by managers may be contrary to
pensation paid to shareholder-employees in closely-held corporations and if it deems the
compensation to be "unreasonable," it will disallow the deduction for the compensation
and treat the payment as a dividend to the recipient. The corporation may challenge that
determination, but it bears the burden of proving reasonableness. Interestingly, in close
corporation cases, if the employee-shareholder's compensation rises dramatically in one
year because of a formula based on profits, the Service (and the courts) are skeptical that
the increased profits were the result of the employee's efforts. See, e.g., Miller Mfg. Co. v.
Commissioner, 149 F.2d 421 (4th Cir. 1945). Thus "performance-based compensation" for-
mulae carry far less weight in close corporation cases than when compensation in publicly-
held corporations is reviewed. Put differently, in publicly-held corporations there is now
an irrebuttable presumption that the CEO is responsible for improving earnings, while for
close corporations, the presumption is almost the opposite. Should this be so?
More accurately, corporate boards in publicly-held corporations probably overly attri-
bute improved performance to CEO performance, while the Service and the courts proba-
bly underestimate the effect that the employee-shareholder's efforts have on corporate
performance. For some reason, the cases questioning compensation in close corporations
rarely focus on the amount of capital invested in the taxpayer company. If the output of a
company is a result of human capital and financial capital, and the latter is not significant
in relation to the former, then compensation to the employee-shareholder should pass
muster. But, typically, the courts do not focus on invested capital, preferring instead to
consider factors such as the employee's responsibilities, the size of the business, and pre-
vailing rates of compensation for comparable positions in comparable firms. See, e.g.,
Charles Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 148, 152 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing Mayson
Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 178 F.2d 115, 119 (6th Cir. 1949)).
On the other hand, in large publicly-held corporations, in which large amounts of capital
are invested, some portion of the profits must be attributable to capital, not to mention
human resources other than the CEO and other factors. One reviewing CEO compensa-
tion in such corporations should take such factors into account.
29. Increases in shareholder wealth, as measured by increases in stock price and divi-
dends, are not the only measure of performance. For instance, performance might be mea-
sured by economic value added to the corporation. This measure is the company's
operating profit less the cost of all capital to produce those profits. See, e.g., Ira S. Walter,
Pay Executives for Their Performance, J. COMPENSATION & BENEFITS, July-Aug. 1992, at 5.
19961
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the best interests of shareholders. 30 To compensate for this additional
risk, the incentive portion of the executive's package would have to be
relatively large, so that the total compensation package would be larger
than a package not similarly risky, even assuming that the base salary is
lower in the riskier package.31 Furthermore, as the performance incen-
tives become more and more attractive, the risk of over-incentivization
increases; that is, the prospect of very high rewards may encourage ques-
tionable behavior to achieve those rewards. Such behavior is hardly un-
known in the corporate world.
32
Similarly, pay plans that include a large component of compensation in
stock, either through stock options or restricted stock, are no panacea.
The number of shares involved, presumably to align interests, has been
staggering and has given rise to shareholder dissatisfaction because of the
resulting dilution.33 Additionally, as the executive becomes over-invested
in the company, the ownership of a large block of stock can misalign
shareholder and executive interests.
The other quick fix-increasing the representation of independent di-
rectors-is similarly overly simplistic. As a preliminary matter, in-
dependent directors dominate most corporate boards, particularly the
boards of larger corporations where much of the concern over executive
compensation has focused.34 So this suggestion is ill-timed, at best. Sec-
ond, even independent directors may feel loyalty to the CEO, either be-
cause of personal relationships with the CEO or because the director was
or is a CEO of another company. Third, there is empirical evidence that
corporations dominated by independent directors do not outperform
companies not so dominated. 35 Indeed, it is somewhat counter-intuitive
that they would. Like employee-directors, directors with a large stake in
the company they manage are likely to pay careful attention to that com-
pany's business. Directors with only casual affiliation, on the other hand,
may shirk their duty.
To respond to this possibility, that is, to increase the incentives for in-
dependent directors to manage more effectively, Professor Charles Elson
30. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain in the Corporate
Web, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16-24 (1986); Ronald J. Gilson, Executive Compensation and
Corporate Governance: An Academic Perspective, 24 INST. ON SEC. REG. 647, 666 (1993).
31. See John E. Garen, Executive Compensation and Principal-Agent Theory, 102 J.
POL. ECON. 1175, 1178, 1180-84 (1994); Murphy, supra note 26, at 723.
32. See, e.g., Arthur P. Brief et al., What's Wrong with the Treadway Commission Re-
port? Experimental Analysis of the Effects of Personal Values and Codes of Conduct on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, 15 J. Bus. Ermics 183 (1996).
33. See Sarah Bowen, Enough!, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R6:
According to Pearl Meyer & Partners Inc., executive-compensation consul-
tants in New York, the proportion of stock allocated to management and
employee equity-compensation plans at the country's 200 largest publicly-
traded industrial and service companies averaged just under 11% of shares
outstanding in the 1995 proxy season. That allocation was a 59% increase
from the 1989 proxy season.
34. See CLARK, supra note 23, at 194 n.il.
35. See Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, Do Independent Directors Matter?
(1996)(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
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has proposed a variant of the independent director model, suggesting that
directors be elected for five year terms, and compensated solely in the
company's stock.36 Such a model, he argues, would "reinvigorate the
board from within... creat[ing] effective management monitoring based
on board self-motivation. '37 Professor Elson supports his recommenda-
tion with an admittedly unscientific survey indicating that companies with
independent boards whose directors own a large amount of the com-
pany's stock (in excess of $100,000 in market value per independent di-
rector) are more likely to have "reasonable" compensation packages for
senior executives. 38 For these purposes, "reasonable" means pay that is
sensitive to corporate performance. 3
9
This recommendation, and others that would radically restructure cor-
porate boards,40 may or may not be a good thing for corporate govern-
ance in the long term, but they are definitely inappropriate for dealing
solely with a perceived problem of excessive compensation. In that re-
gard, Elson's suggestion would be quite costly to the shareholders be-
cause the outside directors would receive large grants of corporate stock
and the cash to pay the applicable income taxes. Depending on the size
of the board, the number of shares outstanding, and the liquidity of the
stock, the outside directors as a group may end up holding a key block of
stock. Moreover, to implement this suggestion, the corporate law of
every state would have to be amended in a substantial fashion, which is
not very likely.
Shareholders frustrated by the levels of executive compensation,
whether or not compensation is linked to a performance plan, have had
little success in seeking relief from the courts. The next section sets forth
the obstacles to judicial relief, obstacles that are unlikely to be altered
any time soon. Given the continuing political concern over executive
compensation and the lack of a judicial remedy, the Securities and Ex-
change Commission and the Congress each reacted in the early 1990s
with complimentary "solutions." These solutions are also analyzed and
criticized below.
Because executive compensation remains a hot button topic, I con-
clude this Article with a proposal for further reform based on the notion
that further reform might perfect the shareholder involvement in the pro-
cess (a goal of both the SEC proposal and the Congressional tax-based
solution) and adequately respond to public concern that the process by
36. Charles M. Elson, Executive Overcompensation-A Board-Based Solution, 34 B.C.
L. REV. 937 (1993).
37. Id. at 996.
38. Id. at 990-95.
39. Id. at 990.
40. See, e.g., Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director:
An Agenda for Institutional Investors, 43 STAN. L. REV. 863 (1991) (calling for the creation
of a cadre of professional directors); Martin Lipton & Steven A. Rosenblum, A New Sys-
tem of Corporate Governance: The Quinquennial Election of Directors, 58 U. Cw. L. REV.




which compensation is determined is flawed.41
III. JUDICIAL INTERVENTION
The shareholder seeking to challenge executive compensation must
persuade the court that, on the merits, the compensation is so excessive
as to constitute a waste of corporate assets. This "rule" was stated in the
oft-cited U.S. Supreme Court case of Rogers v. Hill:4 2 "'If a bonus pay-
ment has no relation to the value of services for which it is given, it is in
reality a gift in part, and the majority of stockholders have no power to
give away corporate property against the protest of the minority."'' 43 As
daunting as this standard is, requiring proof that there is "no relation"
between the compensation and the value of the services, it pales in com-
parison to the procedural obstacles of demand (on the board of directors
and shareholders) and the business judgment rule,44 which the plaintiff
must overcome before the merits are reached.
The courts, in the case of the business judgment rule, and the legisla-
tures, in the case of the demand requirement, have constructed proce-
dural obstacles because they have recognized the importance of limiting
the review of business decisions in the courts. Judges face a particularly
difficult task in determining the proper compensation of corporate execu-
tives. While courts do determine "reasonable compensation" for pur-
poses of determining the deductibility of compensation paid to
shareholder-employees of closely-held corporations, and in cases where
majority shareholders of closely-held corporations allegedly abused their
positions to the detriment of minority shareholders, such cases are not
41. Some writers have suggested a greater role for the judiciary. See, e.g., Carl T.
Bogus, Excessive Executive Compensation and the Failure of Corporate Democracy, 41
BUFF. L. REv. 1 (1993); Joshua A. Kreinberg, Reaching Beyond Performance Compensa-
tion in Attempts to Own the Corporate Executive, 45 DUKE L.J. 138 (1995); Detlev Vagts,
Challenges to Executive Compensation: For the Markets or the Courts?, 8 J. CORP. L. 231
(1983).
42. 289 U.S. 582 (1933).
43. Id. at 591-92 (quoting Rogers v. Hill, 60 F.2d 109, 113-14 (2d Cir. 1932) (Swan, J.,
dissenting)). In Delaware, the standard is probably even more difficult for the plaintiff. In
a case in which a shareholder challenged, as a waste of corporate assets, the grant of stock
options approved by the shareholders of a Delaware corporation, the Delaware Supreme
Court said that the presence of shareholder ratification shifts the burden to the plaintiff to
demonstrate that "'no person of ordinary sound business judgment would say that the con-
sideration received for the options was a fair exchange."' Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d
211, 224 (Del. 1979) (quoting Kaufman v. Schoenberg, 91 A.2d 786, 791 (Del Ch. 1952)).
44. Though variously stated, the business judgment rule immunizes a business decision
of the board of directors from judicial review if the directors had no conflict of interest
with respect to the decision in question, acted in good faith and on an informed basis, and
rationally believed that their action was in the best interests of the corporation. The courts
have adopted a presumption that the directors behaved in this fashion, and this presump-
tion has meant that the courts rarely reach the merits of a challenge to executive compen-
sation. Thus, were Rogers to arise today, it is likely that application of the business
judgment rule would not allow it to get as far as it did in 1933. For a general discussion of
the business judgment rule, see Mark J. Loewenstein, Toward an Auction Market for Cor-




easily applied to cases alleging excessive compensation in publicly-held
corporations.
Tax cases are decided in a unique environment. The parties are the
IRS and the corporate taxpayer. The question of how much the executive
should be paid is in some sense not at issue. The employee will retain all
payments made; only the deductibility of those payments is at issue.
More importantly, because of the structure of the Internal Revenue
Code, and section 162, the relevant Code provision at issue, it is clear that
the burden of proof is on the taxpayer to sustain the reasonableness of
the compensation for purposes of deductibility. Finally, it is worth noting
that there is a necessity of judicial review here; otherwise the final arbiter
is the Internal Revenue Service, an obviously unacceptable situation.
Similarly, the necessity for judicial review in the case of compensation
decisions in closely-held corporations is manifest. In litigation challeng-
ing compensation in closely-held corporations, the majority shareholders
are typically the officers and directors who, in effect, set their own com-
pensation. In those circumstances, the courts are concerned about major-
ity shareholders "oppressing" the minority, diverting assets that might
otherwise go to the minority in the form of dividends or additional com-
pensation.45 Because there is in effect no independent board of directors
to protect the minority shareholders from overreaching by the majority
and generally no market for the stock of the minority shareholders, judi-
cial review is the only protection available to minority shareholders.
Even then, the burden of proof in some states rests with the complaining
minority shareholder to prove that the compensation is unjust, oppres-
sive, or fraudulent. 46
By comparison, in a shareholder derivative action attacking the propri-
ety of the compensation paid to the CEO of a publicly-held corporation,
the burden of proof is always on the shareholder-plaintiff, as it ought to
be, and the relevant standard (if the merits were ever reached) is not
simply unreasonableness, but waste or fraudulent conduct. This, too, is as
it ought to be. Otherwise, the courts would be overwhelmed with litiga-
tion and would become the primary determiners of corporate compensa-
tion, not a happy turn of events.
The procedural barriers that allow the courts to avoid these disputes
are typified in cases such as Aronson v. Lewis,47 a Delaware case, and
Saigh v. Busch,48 a Missouri case. In Delaware, for instance, a derivative
plaintiff must make demand on the board of directors unless demand is
excused because it would be futile. If demand is made, and the board
45. Iwasaki v. Iwasaki Bros., Inc., 649 P.2d 598, 601 (Or. App. 1982) ("Payment of
excessive salaries can constitute oppressive conduct.").
46. Krukemeier v. Krukemeier, 551 N.E.2d 885, 887-88 (Ind. App. 1990). In other
states, the burden of proof is on the defendant-directors. See, e.g., Newton v. Hornblower,
Inc., 582 P.2d 1136, 1146 (Kan. 1978); see generally 1 F. H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON,
O'NEAL'S OPPRESSION OF MINORIrY SHAREHOLDERS § 3:08 (2d ed. 1985 & Supp. 1996).
47. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1983).
48. 396 S.W.2d 9 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
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decides to dismiss the litigation, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the
board's decision to dismiss the litigation-itself a business decision-is
not entitled to the generous protections of the business judgment rule, a
heavy burden if the board follows certain procedures. 49 Typically, there-
fore, the derivative plaintiff does not make demand on the board, but
instead alleges in the complaint that demand was not made because it
would be futile to do so. The plaintiff's self-interested determination of
futility is typically challenged by the defendants, thereby requiring the
plaintiff to justify the conclusion that demand would be futile. At this
stage, the plaintiff is confined to its complaint, which must allege with
particularity facts which create a reasonable doubt that the directors' ac-
tion being challenged in the litigation (the compensation decision) was
entitled to the protections of the business judgment rule. 5
0
On its face, this standard does not sound terribly onerous; after all,
there need only be a doubt that the business judgment rule applies. But
the difficulty arises from the way the Aronson court determined that a
doubt arises-from specific facts alleged in the complaint.51 Thus, the
plaintiff may wish to allege that the directors are not entitled to the pro-
tections of the business judgment rule because they were controlled by
the CEO whose compensation they determined and, therefore, their deci-
sion was not the product of their independent judgment. But such an
allegation will not create the necessary doubt unless specific facts are al-
leged that demonstrate, for instance, "that through personal or other re-
lationships the directors are beholden to the controlling person." 52 The
court said control could not be demonstrated by the mere fact that the
controlling person owned a majority of the corporation's shares. Even
directors in such a corporation remain clothed with the "presumptions of
independence. ' 53 Moreover, at this stage of the litigation, the plaintiff is
not yet entitled to discovery and so may not know the existence of such
personal or other relationships. This is not necessarily a bad thing-it has
the effect of deterring plaintiffs who wish to engage in a fishing
expedition.
On the other hand, there are instances-and Aronson may be one-
where the compensation arrangement being challenged and the CEO's
apparent control suggest that maybe the directors were not all that in-
dependent. Put in other words, the plaintiff's allegations arguably raised
a reasonable inference that the directors' actions were not protected by
the business judgment rule. The Delaware Court of Chancery at least so
found in this case. 54 Withstanding the motion to dismiss would then al-
low the plaintiff the opportunity to conduct the necessary discovery to
prove the inference. But the Delaware Supreme Court would not allow
49. See CLARK, supra note 23, at 645-49.
50. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 815.
51. Id. at 814.
52. Id. at 815.
53. Id.
54. 466 A.2d 375, 385 (Del. Ch. 1983).
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the plaintiff to go forward, absent more specific allegations.55
Saigh suggests another procedural hurdle-demand on the sharehold-
ers. Many statutes dealing with derivative actions require the derivative
plaintiff to make demand on the board and the shareholders. 56 The rea-
son for demand on the board is clear-the board ought to be able to
pursue or abandon the claim based on its sound business judgment. The
rationale for requiring demand on the shareholders is less clear. The Mis-
souri statute at issue in Saigh provided, as statutes typically do, that:
The petition shall also set forth with particularity the efforts of the
plaintiff to secure from the managing directors or trustees, and, if
necessary, from the shareholders, such action as he desires, and the
reasons for his failure to obtain such action or the reasons for not
making such effort.
57
In Saigh, the plaintiff alleged that Anheuser-Busch, Inc., a publicly-
held corporation, had paid excessive compensation to its CEO, August A.
Busch, Jr. The trial court dismissed the claim, and the Missouri Court of
Appeals affirmed the dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
make demand on the shareholders or adequately allege why demand
should be excused.58 Read literally, the above-quoted rule of civil proce-
dure arguably doesn't apply as the plaintiff was seeking to cause the cor-
poration to recover excessive compensation from an officer, and the
plaintiff could not "secure... from the shareholders... such action.... "
The shareholders, as a group, did not have the ability to recover the ex-
cessive compensation in the absence of litigation. They could only pursue
litigation through the board. Therefore, it should not have been neces-
sary for the plaintiff to approach the shareholders at all. Moreover, the
rule in Rogers, quoted above, states that the shareholders cannot ratify
compensation that is so excessive as to constitute a gift or waste of corpo-
rate property. 59 So, it would seem that where the plaintiff alleges such
compensation, it would make no sense to require him to seek shareholder
input in any form.
But, consistent with judicial avoidance of compensation cases, the court
did not read the rule in this fashion. Instead, the court said demand on
the shareholders as a body would be excused only where the petition al-
leges that the officers and directors of the corporation engaged in acts
that were ultra vires, illegal, or fraudulent, because such acts cannot be
ratified by even a majority of the stockholders.60 Claims of excessive
compensation, the court said, merely call into question the board's exer-
55. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 816. See also Schwartz v. Rosenthal, 171 N.Y.S.2d 698
(1958) (in the absence of factual allegations establishing dominance by the president of the
corporation, conclusory allegations would not sustain the complaint).
56. See generally J. R. Kemper, Annotation, Circumstances Excusing Demand Upon
Other Shareholders Which Is Otherwise Prerequisite to Bringing of Stockholder's Derivative
Suit on Behalf of Corporation, 48 A.L.R. 3d 595 (1973).
57. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 507.070(2) (Vernon 1952).
58. Saigh, 396 S.W.2d at 24.
59. Rogers, 289 U.S. at 734.
60. Saigh, 396 S.W.2d at 17 (emphasis added).
1996]
SMU LAW REVIEW
cise of its managerial discretion, which does not rise to the level of ultra
vires, illegality, or fraud.61 More importantly, the court suggested that
shareholders could ratify the payments or, alternatively, could decide (in
some unspecified procedure) to "call upon the board of directors to bring
the action ... or ... replace the board of directors. '62 The court thus
held that before the derivative plaintiff can challenge the compensation,
the shareholders must first be asked whether they wish to ratify the ac-
tion, instruct the board of directors to pursue a lawsuit, or replace the
board. 63 One can easily imagine the difficulties the plaintiff would face,
financially and logistically, of calling such a meeting in a large publicly-
held corporation.
The affect of cases such as Aronson and Saigh is to make the rule of
Rogers v. Hill an illusive promise. While Rogers suggests that there is
some outer limit to executive compensation in publicly-held corporations,
in fact the courts just do not reach the merits of a claim of excessive
compensation.64 This is well illustrated in litigation involving Victor Pos-
ner, a financier whose exploits have been reported in the popular press.
Among other controversies that have involved Mr. Posner are claims that
he caused corporations controlled by him to pay him excessive compensa-
tion. These claims were litigated in a shareholder derivative action that
was ultimately settled.65 The settlement came before Vice Chancellor
Hartnett who, with expressed reluctance, approved the settlement. The
Vice Chancellor was reluctant because the terms of the settlement did not
include any recovery for previous payments to Mr. Posner, which he sug-
gested were "grossly excessive. '66 The Vice Chancellor noted that Mr.
Posner was paid in excess of $7 million per annum by the defendant cor-
porations, putting him among the highest paid corporate executives in the
country at a time when the corporate defendants "are suffering great
losses and some are in, or have been, or [may] soon be, bankrupt." 67 But
the Vice Chancellor acknowledged "that Aronson v. Lewis and Pogostin
v. Rice68 impose a great burden on a plaintiff who seeks to challenge [ex-
cessive compensation]. "69
Vice Chancellor Hartnett was not subtle in his opinion. His distaste for
the actions of the defendants and procedural obstacles to trial was evi-
dent. While there were other reasons why the court affirmed the settle-
ment,70 it was clear that Aronson would make it difficult to reach the
merits, about which the court harbored no doubt. It is not surprising,
61. Id. at 18.
62. Id. at 19.
63. Id. at 24.
64. Rogers, 289 U.S. at 234.
65. Kovacs v. NVF Co., No. 8466, 1987 WL 17042, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 16, 1987).
66. Id. at *4.
67. Id.
68. 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984).
69. Kovacs, 1987 WL 17042, at *3.
70. Among the reasons cited by the Vice Chancellor was the fact that no one came
forth with an offer to take over the litigation on behalf of the stockholders. Id. at *5.
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therefore, that there are no appellate court cases affirming an order re-
ducing the compensation of an executive in a publicly-held corporation
on the theory of waste or gift.71
In sum, then, a self-help remedy of litigation is essentially unavailable
to the disgruntled shareholder. Although this may be regrettable, be-
cause the judiciary is often looked to as the ultimate guarantor of fair-
ness, second guessing corporate business decisions is an area about which
the courts have long felt insecure,72 and are likely to remain so. More-
over, because these are publicly-traded corporations, shareholders do
have the alternative of selling their stock. But this is not a complete rem-
edy because, to the extent the problem is widespread, alternative invest-
ments would not avoid the problem. Furthermore, even if a sale were a
complete remedy, the perception problem would remain. This likely ex-
plains, I believe, the motivation for the involvement of the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
IV. THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION'S RESPONSE
It is important to recognize the two independent concerns with respect
to claims that corporate executives are overcompensated: first, that there
is a deficiency in the structure of corporate governance that must be recti-
fied; and, second, that even if there is no deficiency in corporate govern-
71. Plaintiffs have had some modest success in challenging stock option grants, golden
parachutes, and pension grants, on the basis of lack of consideration. See, e.g., Fogelson v.
American Woolen Co., 170 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1948) (reversing the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of defendant in a suit challenging the creation and funding of a retirement
plan allegedly created to benefit the corporation's president, who planned to retire 18
months after the creation of the plan); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979)
(reversing a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant in a shareholder derivative
suit challenging the cancellation and reissuance of stock options at a lower price); Kerbs v.
California Eastern Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652 (Del. 1952) (holding that stock options which
were immediately exercisable upon grant (and for a period of six months after termina-
tion) would be enjoined because the grant would not induce an employee to remain in the
employ of the company); Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250 (1989) (reversing
a grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants in a case challenging the amendment,
in the heat of a takeover battle, to a golden parachute plan that substantially improved the
benefits payable to officers of the target company, all of whom resigned after the
takeover).
Compare Cohen v. Ayers, 449 F. Supp 298 (N.D. I11. 1978) (holding that the cancellation
and reissuance of a stock option grant was supported by consideration since the corpora-
tion received the continued service of the benefited employees) and Teich v. National Cast-
ings Co., 201 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ohio 1962) (upholding an amendment by the directors to
a shareholder-approved pension plan that doubled the pension of a retired CEO).
72. Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 679 (Sup. Ct.), affd, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1941) (mem.):
Assuming, arguendo, that the compensation should be revised, what yard-
stick is to be employed? Who or what is to supply the measuring rod? The
conscience of equity? Equity is but another name for human being tempo-
rarily judicially robed. He is not omnipotent or omniscient. Can equity be so
arrogant as to hold that it knows more about managing [a] corporation than
its stockholders?
See also Saxe v. Brady, 184 A.2d 602, 610 (Del. Ch. 1970).
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ance, the rate of pay is too high as a matter of social policy. The
Securities and Exchange Commission has reacted to the first concern in
what might be characterized as a weak foray into the field of corporate
governance. In October 1992, the Commission amended its rules "gov-
erning disclosure of executive compensation in proxy and information
statements and other Commission filings."
'73
Some on the Commission may have felt that shareholders would more
knowledgeably exercise their franchise with additional information, or
that when required to make full disclosure, corporate boards would exer-
cise more restraint in determining executive compensation. Indeed, the
SEC's Chief Economist, Susan Woodward, defended the rules "as a mod-
erate course aimed at diffusing some of the political rhetoric about execu-
tive pay."'74 In any case, the new rules are less than ideal.
The rules do accomplish their stated purpose: to increase disclosure to
shareholders. But like so many Commission disclosure rules, these rules
result in too much disclosure. The rules, which, occupy nineteen pages of
three-column fine print in the Federal Register, require, among other
things, that the annual proxy statement include:
- a table covering a three-year period which sets forth the major com-
ponents of the pay of the CEO and other highly-paid executives;
- tables detailing option grants, holdings, and exercises, including val-
ues of options granted;
- a chart comparing the company's performance, in terms of stock
price and dividends to shareholders, to the performance of a "peer
group" of publicly-held corporations and to the stock market as a whole;
and
- a narrative report from the company's compensation committee
which describes its compensation philosophy.
75
That is a lot of disclosure, probably more than would interest the typi-
cal shareholder. Even a conscientious shareholder is likely to focus on
the first table-the annual compensation summary-to the exclusion of
the other information in the statement. Furthermore, having discovered
compensation that the shareholder considers excessive, the shareholder's
only readily available option, other than selling the stock, is to vote
against the entire board. Such a vote, by its very nature, is ambiguous:
was the dissenting shareholder displeased with the corporation's perform-
ance, its environmental record, its business plan, or the qualifications of
the directors? Not surprisingly, the SEC's initiative has not been em-
braced as a solution to the perceived problem.
Soon after the Commission promulgated its new disclosure rules, Con-
gress weighed in with a solution of its own, amending section 162 of the
IRC to add a new subsection capping the deducibility of executive
73. 57 Fed. Reg. 48,126 (1992).
74. Tax Cap on Executive Pay Likely, Former SEC Chief Economist Predicts, 24 Sec.
Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 45, at 1739 (Nov. 13, 1992).




V. AMENDMENT TO THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
In 1993, Congress amended the tax code to limit the deductibility of
executive compensation paid to officers in publicly-held corporations to
$1 million, unless the excess compensation is paid pursuant to a perform-
ance-based plan meeting certain criteria.77 The criteria include two re-
quirements that might be characterized as federal corporate governance
standards: first, the performance-based plan must be approved by both a
compensation committee and the shareholders; and second, the compen-
sation committee must be comprised solely of two or more "outside di-
rectors" (a defined term).78 By limiting deductibility, Congress might
have sought to create incentives to adopt performance-based plans and
the corresponding reforms in corporate governance. Some in Congress
might have held the expectation that the effect of the section would be to
somehow limit compensation. Regardless of motivation, the congres-
sional approach is cumbersome, ineffective in limiting compensation, and
ill-advised.
This code-based solution to excessive executive compensation is unsat-
isfactory for many reasons. First, one might question whether the Inter-
nal Revenue Code ought to be used to police this area. Should the
income tax code be used merely to raise revenue, or, additionally, to im-
plement public policy? 79 This is, of course, a fundamental policy question
currently being debated in the public arena, and further discussion is be-
yond the purview of this Article. Moreover, if any of the major tax re-
form proposals currently under discussion-such as a flat tax or a value
added tax-were to be adopted, the reforms of section 162(m) might be
lost.
But more to the point, regulating executive compensation through the
Internal Revenue Code results in long and complicated regulations, reve-
nue rulings, and, inevitably, a layer of litigation. Regulations, by their
very nature, tend to treat unlike cases alike, limiting flexibility in corpo-
76. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103-66, § 13,211, 107
Stat. 312, 449 (1993).
77. These criteria are:
1. The compensation was payable solely because the executive achieved a
pre-established, nondiscretionary, objective performance goal.
2. The goal was determined by a committee of the board of directors com-
prised solely of two or more "outside" directors.
3. The shareholders approved the goals by a majority vote.
4. Prior to payment of the performance compensation, the board's com-
pensation committee verifies the propriety of the payment.
Kevin J. Ryan, Note, Rethinking Section 162(m)'s Limitation on the Deduction of Executive
Compensation: A Review of the Commentary, 15 VA. TAX. REv. 371, 379 (1995).
78. Id.
79. In enacting § 162(m), Congress estimated that additional tax revenue generated in
1995 would amount to only $55 million. STAFF OF JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 103D
CONG., 1ST SESS., ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS OF THE REVENUE PROVISIONS OF H.R.
2264 1 (Aug. 4, 1993).
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rate planning that may be desirable. For instance, the regulations provide
that the performance goals must be "nondiscretionary," which precludes
the compensation committee from creating a bonus pool and distributing
the proceeds in accordance with the committee's discretion, even if the
size of the pool itself is based on an objective formula. (The regulations
do permit discretion to reduce, but not increase, a performance bonus.)
The rationale behind the regulation is understandable, but the effect is
unfortunate. Allowing a committee to distribute such a bonus pool might
achieve more in terms of incentive and equity than a predetermined allo-
cation formula would achieve. Moreover, the "reduce but not increase"
discretion invites manipulation, encouraging a plan that fixes a large per-
formance bonus that is intended to be reduced to a more reasonable
level.8
0
Because section 162(m) applies only to publicly-held corporations, it
creates an unjustifiable distinction between publicly-held corporations
and closely-held corporations. Compensation paid to executives in
closely-held corporations is not subject to the rules of section 162(m); the
base pay of such executives may exceed $1 million and remain fully de-
ductible if the compensation is reasonable under all of the facts and cir-
cumstances. 81 In competing for chief executives, therefore, publicly-held
corporations find themselves at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis
closely-held corporations. This disadvantage may not be large, but it is
unnecessary.
In addition, the $1 million cap is both too high and too low. It is too
high because many companies do not pay that much in compensation to
their executives.82 Furthermore, as a theoretical matter at least, compen-
sation may be excessive even if below $1 million. At the other extreme,
the largest companies have been paying well in excess of $1 million in
base pay, and that may be justified.
Another problem with this approach is the inevitable creation of loop-
holes. For instance, because deductibility turns on when the compensa-
tion is paid, compensation deferred and paid on retirement is not subject
to the cap. Not surprisingly, companies are taking advantage of the de-
ferred compensation loophole and paying interest on the amounts de-
ferred. When paid, the entire amount is deductible. Similarly, the cap
80. One critic cited an example of this phenomenon. Salomon Bros. adopted a bonus
plan that would allow payment of up to $24 million per year to the CEO. In past years,
according to this critic, Salomon had never paid a bonus larger than "a few million dol-
lars." Graef Crystal, Need a Good Laugh? Look At Caps on Executive Pay, L.A. TIMES,
May 21, 1995, at D2. Another critic has predicted that § 162(m) will result in higher pay
just for this reason. Murphy, supra note 26, at 739.
81. I.R.C. § 162(a)(1) (West 1996); I.R.C. Reg. § 1.162-7(b)(2) (West 1996); Charles
Schneider & Co. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1974). The burden of proving
reasonableness is on the taxpayer. Botany Worsted Mills v. U.S., 278 U.S. 282, 290 (1929).
82. In one analysis of 1000 proxy statements covering 1992, the author concluded that
only 194 CEOs had nonperformance-based pay in excess of $1 million (that is, excluding
stock options, payments under long-term plans, and bonuses) and only 149 CEOs had base
pay in excess of $1 million. Murphy, supra note 26, at 739.
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applies only to the officers of a publicly-traded company, not the employ-
ees of any non-public subsidiary. While it is unlikely that someone acting
as CEO of a publicly-held corporation would not appear as an officer of
that company, it is not unlikely that individuals with considerable author-
ity, responsibilities, and compensation might be officers of a key, wholly-
owned subsidiary.
8 3
A further objection to section 162(m) is that it discourages compensat-
ing executives in restricted stock unless the restricted stock is awarded as
part of a performance-based plan. This is so because grants of restricted
stock that substitute for cash have to be large in order to compensate
grantees for the added risk of holding stock as opposed to cash. Argua-
bly, from the shareholders' perspective, payment in restricted stock is
preferable to stock options, the most popular way to "align" the execu-
tive's and the shareholders' interests. This is so because if the executive
holds restricted stock, and the price of the stock declines, the executive
continues to have a strong incentive to perform. But with stock options,
those incentives may not continue to be so strong, particularly if the
board has a practice of re-issuing options at a lower price. Also, while an
option holder is disinclined to favor cash dividends, the owner of re-
stricted stock is not.
84
Section 162(m) appears to be based on an unproven assumption and a
faulty premise. The unproven assumption is that CEO pay dependent on
stock performance will align shareholder and executive incentives so that
executives will perform better, or more effectively. In fact, at least one
recent study suggests that there is no relationship between stock option
grants to executives and shareholder returns.
8 5
The faulty premise is that publicly-held corporations will not pay com-
pensation that is not deductible. In fact, they will, thus increasing the
after-tax cost of executive compensation to the shareholders. 86 But even
if many or most affected companies are influenced to adjust their com-
pensation practices to conform to the new rules, there is no reason to
suppose that the level of compensation, which likely motivated Congress
to act, will decline. In fact, in 1994 and 1995, the two years since the new
83. See Crystal, supra note 80, at D2. Graef speculates that Robert Daly and Terry
Semel, who operated the Warner Bros. subsidiary of Time Warner, Inc., earned more than
Gerald Levin, the CEO of Time Warner. See generally Ryan, supra note 77.
84. See Murphy, supra note 26, at 738 n.66.
85. Graef Crystal, CEOs and Incentives: The Myth of 'Pay-for-Performance' Compen-
sation: Analyst's Studies Find No Relationship Whatsoever Between Executive Salary Pack-
ages and Company Results, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 8, 1995, at D1.
86. A review of 1995 proxy statements by William M. Mercer Inc., New York compen-
sation consultants, undertaken for the Wall Street Journal and reported in the Journal's
annual report on executive pay, disclosed that of the 350 companies surveyed, 38 report-
edly paid base salary (that is, not including bonuses or long-term compensation) in excess
of $1 million. The Boss's Pay, WALL ST. J., Apr. 11, 1996, at R15. Graef Crystal conducted
a survey of the pay of 155 CEOs of major corporations in 1994 and found that 25 paid their
CEOs more than $1 million in base salary alone. Crystal, supra note 80, at D2. See also
Andrew R. Brownstein & Morris J. Panner, Who Should Set CEO Pay? The Press? Con-
gress? Shareholders?, HARV. Bus. REV., May-June 1992, at 28, 34.
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section 162(m) became effective, the average CEO salary and bonus in-
creased by more than 10%, far outstripping inflation and general wage
increases. 87 Indeed, because Congress and the IRS have now created a
safe harbor of sorts, there is some reason to suppose that the new rules
will increase compensation levels. While, technically, executive compen-
sation is subject to the same limitations that prevailed before the amend-
ment to section 162,88 plans conforming to the new rules will have a
patina of legitimacy, a patina that may well grow into an armored suit.
If CEOs are overcompensated, it is because of a deficiency in corporate
governance, not because of a deficiency in our income tax laws. The tink-
ering that Congress has done in the corporate governance area is not sub-
stantial. Compensation committees consisting of independent directors
were common before the adoption of section 162(m). Shareholder ratifi-
cation of performance-based plans is a worthwhile innovation, but of
questionable significance. Under current New York Stock Exchange
rules, for instance, listed companies cannot list securities issued to officers
and directors pursuant to options or special remuneration plans unless
the shareholders have approved the plans. 89 In addition, shareholders
are asked to approve plans that may affect many employees not otherwise
covered by section 162(m), and so may approve a plan because, on the
whole, it is in the best interest of the corporation even if the plan may
overcompensate one or more individuals. Furthermore, these plans tend
to be abstract to the shareholders, making them difficult to evaluate. The
resulting approval is correspondingly difficult to assess.
More fundamentally, section 162(m) starts from the presumption that
the current system of corporate governance cannot be trusted with unbri-
dled discretion to fix executive compensation. Under that approach,
compensation committees are limited in their ability to act in the best
interest of the corporation. The committee, therefore, may be reticent to
award bonuses for the achievement of goals that do not lend themselves
to neat quantification; these goals include improving customer satisfac-
tion, improving employee morale, and diversifying the work force. More-
over, even a plan that bases compensation on the achievement of
quantifiable goals, such as earnings per share or return on investment,
might be a "better" plan if some discretion were left with a committee
that could also consider how the company compared to competitors or
how general economic conditions might have affected results. In short,
the removal or limitation of discretion from a board that acts responsibly
may have some unfortunate consequences.
87. The Boss's Pay, supra note 86, at R15.
88. See supra part IV.
89. The rule reads, in relevant part: "Shareholder approval of a plan or arrangement
. . . will be prerequisite to listing when . . . [a] stock option or purchase plan is to be
established or other arrangements made pursuant to which stock may be acquired by of-




Finally, the incentive to adopt performance-based plans may not neces-
sarily operate in the shareholders' interest, especially if executive pay is
too closely linked to share prices. If a CEO's compensation is largely
dependent on share price, the CEO may pursue strategies that raise
short-term profits and, thus, share prices, at the expense of long-term re-
turns. For instance, a short-term reduction in advertising or research ex-
penses may boost the company's stock price in the short term, as earnings
increase, with the effect felt further down the road.90 Furthermore, sec-
tion 162(m) creates an incentive to use stock price as a proxy for
performance.
VI. CONCLUSION: A MODEST PROPOSAL
The public outcry over executive compensation has produced modest
and misguided administrative and legislative response at the federal level.
But so long as there remains a reasonable doubt that there is market
failure, the case for additional and significant legislative, administrative,
or judicial intervention is not compelling. Even though existing legal
standards may provide a marginal role, at best, for the judiciary, the pros-
pect of judicial activism in this area is not attractive. 91 But the unavaila-
bility of a judicial remedy and the shortcomings of the federal responses
discussed above, when considered in light of the continuing public con-
cern, suggests that additional, measured steps ought to be considered. In
this light, I offer such a step: the requirement that shareholders vote an-
nually to approve or disapprove the CEO's whole compensation package
(the salary, bonus, and performance incentives).
I propose that this shareholder vote be an advisory vote only, cast in
terms of a motion to the shareholders to ratify the CEO pay, even if they
have already approved a long-term performance plan which accounts for
a portion of the current pay package. In this regard, it is important to
note that an incentive program passed in one year may be undercut by a
salary and bonus plan proposed in a later year, which may have the effect
of reducing the risk portion of the previouslyapproved performance plan.
The idea of shareholder ratification is a modest and logical step from
current SEC policy regarding shareholder voting on executive compensa-
tion. Under current SEC interpretations of Rule 14a-8 of the SEC's
proxy rules, shareholders who otherwise meet the eligibility requirements
under the rules for submitting proposals for inclusion in the proxy materi-
als may submit nonbinding proposals regarding executive compensa-
90. See Dean Foust, The SEC's CEO-Pay Plan: No Panacea, Bus. WK., July 6, 1992, at
37. Dean Foust describes the effects of an incentive plan that rewarded Ralston Purina
executives nearly 500,000 shares if the stock closed above 100 for 10 straight days. Man-
agement borrowed funds and much of the company's free cash flow to buy back nearly
one-third of the company's outstanding stock, with the resulting effect that the goal was
reached. However, the stock soon drifted back down, which analysts reportedly attributed
to "excessive financial engineering and a lack of attention to core businesses." Id. See also
BOK, supra note 14, at 112-13.
91. See supra part III.
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tion.92 But in adopting its disclosure on executive compensation, the
SEC stopped short of requiring shareholder ratification of executive com-
pensation, suggesting instead that shareholder dissatisfaction be ex-
pressed by voting the directors out of office.93 The proposal suggested
here would mandate shareholder input where it is now permitted (on
shareholder initiative), and would cover more than just performance-
based plans, as section 162(m) requires.94 I thus propose only a logical
extension of current law and SEC regulations.
Shareholder voting makes sense for another reason, suggested by the
Saigh case: shareholders can ratify what is allegedly excessive compensa-
tion.95 Thus, by providing a role for shareholders in advance of litigation,
a procedural hurdle will either be eliminated (if shareholders fail to rat-
ify) or will become insurmountable (if shareholders do ratify). The share-
holder vote proposed here, then, would dovetail nicely with the demand
requirement in derivative litigation, and act as a screening mechanism for
such litigation.
Shareholder ratification of CEO compensation can serve other pur-
poses as well. First, ratification provides an outlet for shareholders to
express directly to the board their view of the matter. There is much
speculation that shareholders are unhappy with the level of CEO com-
pensation, but no hard proof of it exists. It may be the case that, in the
vast majority of publicly-held corporations, the shareholders are perfectly
satisfied with the level of CEO compensation. If so, the advisory vote
would moot much of the speculation and sensationalistic stories in the
popular media. On the other hand, if the shareholders are dissatisfied
with the compensation, this vote gives them a way to voice their con-
cerns-a way that may have an impact.
Second, the data received in such an advisory vote can be useful to the
board. The board can compare the vote to the vote in prior years for the
same corporation and to the vote in similarly-sized corporations in the
same industry. This serves as a gauge by which to measure their compen-
sation decisions. This sort of data is also more meaningful than a simple
vote not to reelect the board.
This suggestion should be particularly welcomed by institutional share-
holders who have become increasingly active in matters of executive
92. In 1992, the SEC reversed its previous policy of permitting reporting companies to
omit shareholder proposals dealing with executive compensation. In letters issued to 10
companies, the Division of Corporate Finance staff told the companies that shareholder
proposals must be included in the proxy materials. See Staff Advises Shareholder Proposals
on Pay Includible in Probe Materials, 24 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) No. 8, at 250-51 (Feb.
21, 1992).
93. Id.
94. When testifying before Congress, Chairman Breeden of the Securities and Ex-
change Commission said that "judging the appropriateness of the directors' decision [on
compensation] should be up to the shareholders, not the government." Hearings on § 119f
Before the Subcomm. on Taxation of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess.
(1992) (statement of Richard C. Breeden, Chairman, SEC).
95. Saigh v. Busch, 396 S.W.2d 9, 20 (Mo. Ct. App. 1965).
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compensation, but have lacked a convenient and systematic way to ex-
press their concerns. This proposal provides that means. Moreover, we
ought not to be too shy in giving shareholders this role in CEO compen-
sation. Executive compensation is a central component in the corporate
governance system. In that regard, it is akin to the capital structure of the
corporation, influencing management's business decisions and, therefore,
shareholder returns.
96
Third, there is a serious argument that the level of executive compensa-
tion is destructive to the morale of rank and file employees, especially
during a period of corporate downsizing and stagnating wages. 97 Resent-
ment over executive compensation may account for some of the appeal of
so-called populist candidates such as Patrick Buchanan, who criticize "big
businesses" that have harmed the "little guy."'98 An approving vote by
shareholders diffuses some of this criticism, as the responsibility for the
compensation no longer rests solely with an "elite" board. Furthermore,
disapproval by the shareholders may lead to action by the board which
results in a reduction of the compensation.
This change could be accomplished easily by an amendment to state
corporate codes, to section 162 of the Internal Revenue Code, to the list-
ing requirements of national securities exchanges, or by a change to sec-
tion 14 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. Shareholders can
force the change by amending the bylaws of the corporation to require
such a vote, and corporations can adopt the concept voluntarily now by
board resolution, without any change in the law.
A change in corporate governance of this nature will have neither a
dramatic nor immediate impact on CEO compensation. But it may have
a significant effect in the long term, as feedback from the shareholders
works its way back to the board. It is a suggestion intended to compli-
ment regular market forces, not interfere with them. It could replace the
ill-conceived amendment to the Internal Revenue Code as shareholders,
not the Internal Revenue Service, play a more active role in compensa-
tion decisions. As a matter of policy, it is worth trying before the other,
more radical suggestions that have already been made are implemented.
Moreover, unlike many of the proposals in this area, it is easy to imple-
ment, both legally and practically.
96. See Gilson, supra note 30, at 656.
97. See MONKS & MINOW, supra note 27, at 170. See also Great Divide, supra note 2,
at R1 (discussing the effect of high CEO pay on employee morale).
98. Roger Lowenstein, Why Primary Voters Are So Angry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 22, 1996,
at Cl (indicating that "real median family income has been stagnant for 20 years").
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